Bond Hearing

You are invited to listen for yourself. After 22 months of incarceration with no counsel of record on non-capital allegations, the Centerville Tennessee court finally holds a "bond hearing" via Zoom. Forced to proceed isolated away from the court, away from his accusers and and away from his own  "counsel", Matthew listens:

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The Defendant, Matthew James Amick, was denied effective assistance of counsel during the critical-stage bond hearing held May 20, 2021. Counsel failed to object to inadmissible testimony, declined to cross-examine the State’s key law enforcement witness, allowed known perjured testimony from State’s witness Rebecca Amick whom Douglas T. Bates IV had previously represented and took no action to preserve the record for appeal. These omissions and commissions, denied the Defendant adversarial testing and constitute structural error under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008).

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Although the judge noted that a court reporter was present at the bond hearing, the Defendant’s formal Pro Se Motion for Transcripts to be Provided at Public Expense, was denied by the court—sua sponte and without State objection—on October 9, 2024. The Defendant now submits a substantially verbatim transcript under Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c), with an accompanying declaration. See Exhibit R.

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During the hearing, the State introduced a series of highly prejudicial statements to which counsel raised no objection:

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Uncharged conduct and victim impact testimony was admitted that the Defendant had “tried to kill” his ex-wife and her son with an “arsenal of weapons”, and claims that they would “always be afraid of him"—admitted without objection under Rules 404(b), 403, and relevance grounds. Speculation and lay opinion was admitted as Mr. Amick’s ex-wife was allowed to offer speculative predictions about bond compliance and about his mental health without expert foundation, violating Rules 602, 701, and 702. Improper factual and legal conclusions were admitted as Officer Carroll testified of what he heard, that the defendant allegedly claimed he “would not be taken alive" and characterized a firearm as a “machine gun” and referenced post-arrest statements without clarity on Miranda warnings, with no challenge under Rules 702, 802, or the Fifth Amendment. Irrelevant and cumulative material was admitted as the State elicited decade-old employment history and repeated traumatic detail, further inflaming the court and prejudicing bond consideration, without objection.

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The judge made sua sponte remarks that introduced unsupported character assumptions, stating “there’s a pattern” and “I think we need a drug and alcohol assessment,” despite no record evidence suggesting substance abuse. More concerning, the judge endorsed the prosecution’s fear-based rationale: “It’s pretty rare for us to want to allow someone out on bond but send them away, and the reason we send them away is because we’re afraid of them here.” These comments reflect a predisposition to deny liberty based on generalized fear, not individualized facts in violation of Canon 2A and Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286 (Tenn. 2005). Counsel made no objection, and the absence of adversarial challenge permitted the narrative to stand uncorrected, rendering the proceeding structurally defective.

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Defense counsel also failed to ask a single question of the State’s lead investigator and agreed to an unnecessary four-month continuance despite the Defendant’s 22-month pretrial incarceration. These acts and omissions enabled a one-sided narrative, resulting in continued detention, coercive pressure, and later waivers of trial rights.

The trial court denied the Defendant’s formal pro se Motion for the transcript, which deprived the Defendant of access to the record and compelled a Rule 24(c) reconstruction. The Defendant’s submission is not new evidence, but a faithful restoration arising from the contemporaneous bond hearing, which constitutes part of the trial record, judicially suppressed. The State may not benefit from a procedural bar where the trial court itself frustrated the Defendant’s access to the record.  State v. Bennett, 798 S.W.2d 783 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).

The Defendant respectfully requests that the conviction and sentence be vacated and a new trial granted. In the alternative, this ground is preserved for post-conviction review under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103.